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  This paper examines the economic and regulatory challenges that must be faced by 
potential investors in new nuclear power plants in the United States.  The historical development 
of the existing fleet of over 100 nuclear plants and their recent performance history are 
discussed.  The pattern of re-licensing of existing plants and the implications for the role of the 
extended operation of the existing fleet in the overall electricity supply portfolio over the next 50 
years is examined.  The economic competitiveness of investments in new nuclear power plants 
compared to investments in alternative base load technologies is discussed under a variety of 
assumptions about construction costs, fuel costs, competitive and economic regulatory 
environments and various levels of carbon emissions prices affected competing fossil-fueled 
technologies. 
 
  The paper then turns to a discussion of federal government efforts to facilitate investment 
in new nuclear power plants.  These include streamlined licensing procedures and financial 
incentive provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  The regulatory and financial changes 
make investment in new nuclear power plants significantly more attractive to investors.   
However, in the longer run a combination of lower and more stable construction costs combined 
with carbon emissions charges are likely to be necessary to make investments in new nuclear 
plants significantly more attractive than investments in pulverized coal plants.  Unresolved waste 
disposal policies and local opposition to new nuclear plants are likely to represent barriers to 
investment in new nuclear power plants in some areas of the country.  First mover plants that can 
benefit from federal financial incentives are most likely to be built in states that continue to 
regulate generating plants based on cost-of-service principles, transferring construction cost and 
operating performance risks to consumers, and where there is room on existing sites to build 
additional nuclear capacity.  
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The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States: 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges 
 
Paul L. Joskow 
 
1. Introduction and Overview 
 
  Nuclear power now accounts for almost 20% of the electricity produced in the United 
States.  However, the last nuclear power plant completed in the U.S. entered commercial 
operation in 1994 and no new nuclear plants have received construction permits since 1979.  If 
the existing fleet of nuclear plants were to run only until the end of their initial license periods, 
the supply of electricity from nuclear power would begin to decline in about 2015 and reach zero 
in about 2030.  Under current economic conditions, these plants would be replaced primarily 
with a mix of coal and natural-gas fired plants.  However, a large fraction of the nuclear plants 
now operating have received, applied for, or intend to apply for extensions on their operating 
permits that would allow them to continue operating for an additional 20 years.  If all existing 
plants are re-licensed this will extend the date when nuclear electricity supplies begin to decline 
until about 2035 and fall to zero in about 2050, absent construction of any new nuclear power 
plants.  Even if all existing nuclear plants are re-licensed for 20 addition years of operation, the 
fraction of electricity produced with nuclear power in the U.S. will decline monotonically over 
the coming decades if investment in new nuclear generating plants is not forthcoming.   
Additional electricity supplies required to balance supply and demand in the next 25 years will 
come primarily from coal and gas-fired power plants given current cost expectations and in the 
absence of a "price" being placed on CO2 emissions.  
  The decision of most nuclear plant operators to apply for extensions of their initial 
operating licenses reflects several factors.  First, the performance of the existing fleet of nuclear 
plants has improved dramatically over time in terms of capacity factors, operating costs, and 
safety indicators.  Second, the price of alternative fuels and the wholesale market price of 
electricity have increased dramatically.  Third, the incremental capital costs required to extend 
the life of existing plants to meet license renewal requirements is typically small compared to the 
total cost of a new coal or natural gas combined cycle (CCGT) plant.  On a going forward basis, 
life-extensions for existing plants are now very cost-effective and, for merchant plant owners, 
quite profitable.  These developments also favorably impact the relative economic evaluation of 
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investments in new nuclear plants compared to base load alternatives.  However, on a going 
forward basis private investors in new nuclear plants must expect to recover both their operating 
costs and the much higher capital costs of building a new plant from revenues earned from 
electricity produced by the plant.
 1   The necessary revenues must come either from sales of 
power at market prices in states that have adopted competitive market models or through 
regulated retail prices determined through the regulatory process in states where generation 
investments are still subject to regulation.  
  It is worth noting that two actual and potential institutional changes have taken place 
since the existing nuclear fleet was built that will effect the economic evaluations of potential 
private investors in new nuclear plants.  First, in many regions of the country the electric power 
sector has been restructured and the generating segment deregulated (Joskow 2006a).  In these 
regions, investments in new nuclear plants would be on a merchant basis and face standard 
market risks and rewards associated with uncertain construction costs, operating performance, 
and changes in market conditions.  Even in states where generation investments are still 
regulated, long-term commitments for new generating capacity must often be put out for 
competitive bids and both long-term power supply contracts and generating plants built by 
vertically integrated utilities will be subject to performance incentives that will shift more cost 
and performance risk to investors than in the past.  These changes work against capital intensive 
generating technologies like nuclear power because they increase financing costs.  Second, the 
prospect of mandatory controls on CO2 emissions makes it possible that in the not too distant 
future, CO2 emissions will incur a price either in the form of a "green tax" or, more likely, 
payments for (or opportunity costs of allocated) CO2 emissions permits under a cap and trade 
system as is the case in Europe.  Placing a significant price on CO2 emissions would make 
investments in nuclear power more attractive in both competitive and cost-based regulated 
environments. 
 
2. The Existing Nuclear Fleet 
 
  There are 104 commercial nuclear power plants operating in the U.S today.  Eleven 
nuclear plants were shut down during the 1990s, in several case, for economic reasons, prior to 
                                            
1 The economic calculus may be different for state-owned firms and I will not discuss such firm here. 
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the end of their licensed operating lives.  However, no operating nuclear plants have been shut 
down since 1998.  The development of the existing fleet of nuclear plants confronted numerous 
problems along the way that continue to affect business perceptions about potential investments 
in new nuclear plants.  These problems included: lengthy licensing processes, large construction 
cost overruns, long construction periods, poor availability, high operation and maintenance costs, 
the need for early replacement of steam generators and other major pieces of equipment, public 
opposition to construction in several regions of the country, and an accident at the Three Mile 
Island (TMI) nuclear plant in 1979 that had an adverse effect on public perceptions of nuclear 
power safety. This accident also led to increased construction costs for nuclear plants then under 
construction due to post-TMI regulatory delays and plant design changes.  Moreover, the federal 
government has yet to deliver on its promise to take procession of spent fuel and other nuclear 
waste and develop interim and permanent storage facilities for it.  Several utilities completing 
nuclear power plants during the 1980s and early 1990s faced serious financial difficulties as state 
regulators sought to “disallow” portions of their plants’ construction costs from the regulated 
prices for electricity they were permitted to charge.  At least one utility went bankrupt and others 
came close. 
  Moreover, during the late 1980s and 1990s, natural gas prices fell dramatically and price 
forecasts made during this period for future natural gas and coal prices indicated that real 
(controlling for general inflation) natural gas prices would rise slowly and real coal prices would 
continue to fall slowly of the next 25 years (EIA AEO 1998, page 2). As a result, investment in 
natural gas combined-cycle gas turbine technology (CCGT) was perceived as being a lower cost, 
lower financial risk, and more politically acceptable base load generation alternative to both coal 
and nuclear generating technology, especially as competitive wholesale electricity markets began 
to emerge.  Between 1997 and 2005 over 200 GW on new “on grid” generating capacity was 
added in the U.S. (Joskow 2006a), most of it fueled by natural gas.  No new nuclear plants have 
been ordered in the U.S. since 1978. Orders for 124 nuclear units were eventually cancelled.  
Nearly ten years ago, the 1998 EIA Annual Energy Outlook forecasted the gradual demise of 
nuclear power, projecting that 24 nuclear plants would retire before the end of their license 
expiration dates and that 65 plants would retire before 2020 (EIA AEO 1998, pp. 54-56). 
   However, the performance of the existing fleet of plants has improved dramatically over 
time and the economics of both life-extension and new investment have changed significantly in 
   4 
the last few years.  As displayed in Figure 1, real non-fuel operation and maintenance costs have 
fallen (on average) from about 20 mills/kWh in 1992 to 12.5 mills/kWh in 2005 (in constant 
$2003) and total direct real operating costs have fallen from over 27 mills/kWh to less than 17 
mills/kWh during this time period.
2 As displayed in Figure 2, plant capacity factors have 
increased from less that 60% in the late 1980s to close to 90% in the last five years.
3  Various 
safety indicia have improved considerably as well.
4 These improvements in the performance of 
the existing fleet of plants, combined with dramatic increases in natural gas prices and wholesale 
electricity market prices in the last couple of years, have significantly changed perceptions about 
the remaining economic lives of the existing fleet from what they were only a few years ago.  As 
I have already noted, there have been no plants retirements since 1998 and most of the existing 
fleet has received, applied for or expects to apply for 20-year extensions on their licenses to 
bring their licensed operating periods to 60 years.  As of November 2006, 47 plants had received 
license extensions, 9 license extension applications are pending, and another 25 have indicated 
their intension to apply for license extensions.
5 This will extend the life of the existing fleet of 
nuclear plants considerably, with significant plant retirements now not beginning until about 
2035 and the existing fleet closing down completely by about 2050 (assuming no further life 
extensions).  In the process of making investments to extend plant lives, some units are being 
“uprated” modestly and EIA forecasts that this process will create about 3.2 Gw of additional 
nuclear capacity from the existing fleet.  Another 1.3 Gw of capacity is associated with the 
refurbishment and return to service of TVA’s Brown’s Ferry 1 nuclear unit in 2007. 
                                            
2 These numbers do not include all of the costs associated with these plants.  Various owner’s costs including 
regulatory compliance costs, insurance, training, and general corporate overheads are not reflected in these numbers 
as far as I can tell. 
3 There is some selection bias in these figures since when poorly performing nuclear plants close before their design 
lives their poor capacity factors disappear from the data.  There is a close relationship between improvements in 
capacity factors and improvements in "variable" operating costs, since the latter are driven primarily by whether a 
plant to in commercial service for a period of time rather than by how many kWhs it generates during this time 
period. 
4  Annual Report 2005, Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO), 
http://www.nei.org/documents/WANO_Performance_Indicators_2005.pdf, accessed December 1, 2006.  
5 Nuclear Energy Institute, http://www.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=2&catid=343, accessed November 27, 2006. 
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3. Investment in New Nuclear Plants 
 
The changing regulatory and competitive environment 
  The improved performance of the existing fleet of nuclear plants, higher fossil fuel 
prices, new plant designs that vendors claim will result in lower and more predictable 
construction costs, a streamlined construction and operating license process, the prospect of 
future mandatory CO2 emission constraints, and federal financial incentives created by the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, together have had favorable effects on the economic attractiveness of 
investments in new nuclear plants.  In the end, whether or not a company invests in a new 
nuclear plant will be a commercial decision that turns on the (risk adjusted) economic 
attractiveness (cost and profitability) of an investment in nuclear power generating capacity 
compared to investments in alternative generating technologies that can produce equivalent 
quantities of electricity. 
  The economic environment in which nuclear investments will be considered by 
electricity producers has also changed dramatically since the first fleet of nuclear plants was built 
in the United States.  Until the late 1990s most of the nuclear power plants were built by 
investor-owned utilities which were subject to cost of service regulation and had de facto 
exclusive geographic service territories where they charged customers regulated prices 
determined based on cost of service principles that evolved during the 20
th century.  Regulation 
insulated these firms from competition from lower-cost generating companies and typically 
allowed them to shift a large fraction of any construction cost overruns and poor operating 
performance to consumers through regulated prices.  Consumers arguably got the benefits of 
what was then perceived to be an efficient industry structure built around the assumption that 
electricity would be supplies most efficiently to a specific geographic area by vertically 
integrated monopolies subject to price, cost and service quality regulation.   
  This is not to say that utilities building nuclear plants under traditional regulatory 
arrangement during the development of the existing fleet faced no risk from poor performance, 
since some regulatory agencies disallowed what they perceived to be imprudent costs and others 
introduced incentive mechanisms to stimulate better operating performance (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1986).  However, it is fairly clear from the record during this time period when 
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companies were frequently applying for rate increases, that consumers bore a large share of the 
costs associated with construction costs overruns, poor operating performance, and changing 
economic conditions.  This regulatory environment made it possible for many utilities to finance 
nuclear plants using a relatively low cost of capital.  Since nuclear plants were and are more 
capital intensive than pulverized coal or CCGT technology (absent carbon capture and 
sequestration faxcilities), this regulatory environment favored nuclear power by reducing the cost 
of capital, other costs held constant. 
  This regulatory and competitive environment has changed in many areas on the U.S.  In 
most of the Northeast, portions of the Midwest and in Texas, competitive wholesale electricity 
markets have been created and competing merchant generators are free to participate as suppliers 
in these competitive wholesale markets (Joskow 2006a). Wholesale prices for power have been 
deregulated and as transition arrangements come to an end, retail consumers pay prices that 
reflect competitive wholesale market prices not prices determined by cost-of-service regulation. 
(Joskow 2006a).  In the first instance, investors bear all construction cost, operating 
performance, fuel price, and wholesale power market risks, as well as residual regulatory risks 
associated with a restructuring and deregulation process that is still a work in progress.  
  These developments in the competitive and regulatory environment change the financial 
risks associated with nuclear power plant investments in a number of ways.  Development costs 
associated with licensing, site studies and engineering studies, are not recoverable through a 
regulatory process but must be recovered from market revenues when and if a plant is completed 
and is operating.  Construction cost overruns, major equipment replacement costs, variations in 
availability and variations in market price will all be risks that the plant investor will bear.  Of 
course, investor can seek to hedge some or all of these risks through contractual arrangements 
with vendors, construction companies, and forward contracts with market intermediaries and 
retail consumers.  The 1600 Mw nuclear power plant being built by AREVA-Siemens in Finland 
has hedging arrangements of this kind on both the construction cost and energy sale sides (IEA 
2006, p. 352).  However, it is unlikely that the long-term contractual arrangements that the owner 
of the new nuclear plant in Finland has with large buyers of the power supporting the project 
could be replicated widely in those areas of the U.S. that rely on competitive wholesale and retail 
electricity markets.  Let me note clearly as well, that in a competitive market environment it is 
the investors who must be convinced about expected construction costs and plant performance 
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parameters and the ultimate cost and profitability of a potential nuclear power plant project in 
order to get them to invest.  Lobbying to convince government official that investment in new 
nuclear plants represents the lowest cost alternative in regions that have adopted competitive 
models is not particularly productive.   
  There are many states in the U.S., however, which have not implemented comprehensive 
restructuring and deregulation programs for electricity generation (Joskow 2006).  Retail prices 
continue to be regulated, utilities have de facto geographic monopoly service territories where 
consumers are charged for electricity based on regulated prices, and utilities can assume that 
prudently incurred generation costs will be passed through in regulated retail prices. In a 
regulated environment utilities do have to spend a lot of time convincing regulators that their 
proposed investments would be less costly than alternatives in order to get permission to proceed 
with the project and to avail themselves of the protections of cost-of-service regulation.  In these 
states lobbying by nuclear suppliers to convince government officials to accept optimistic cost 
projections may have some value. However, the regulatory environment that prevailed when the 
existing fleet of nuclear plants was built is also changing and is likely to change further as 
proposals by utilities to build new regulated “cost-of-service” generation projects increase.   
  First, many state commissions now require utilities to benchmark proposals to build their 
own generating plants subject to cost of service regulation against proposals from independent 
power producers to supply them with equivalent quantities of power under long term contracts.  
These contracts in turn typically have incentive provisions that place construction cost and 
operating performance risks on the owner of the plant rather than on the utility buying the power 
and ultimately on the utility's customers paying regulated retail prices that include contractual 
payments under purchased power contracts.  Accordingly, in order to get permission from a state 
regulatory agency to build a new plant under cost of service regulation, whether nuclear or non-
nuclear, the regulatory agency will have to be convinced that the proposed project will be less 
costly for consumers than alternatives based on market benchmarks.  Moreover, I believe that it 
is likely that when regulators do allow vertically integrated utilities to build additional plants 
under cost of service regulation that they will include incentive or performance-based regulation 
provisions that are not unlike those in long-term purchased power contracts.  Specifically, I 
expect that they will place more of the risk of construction cost overruns and poor operating 
performance on the utility and less on the utility's retail customers than was the case when the 
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existing nuclear fleet was under construction.  These incentive arrangements will increase the 
risks faced by utilities compared to the old regulatory regime and increase the cost of capital 
properly attributed to the project. 
 
Life-cycle cost comparisons 
  This discussion leads naturally to a discussion of what we know about the expected future 
life-cycle costs of new nuclear power plants compared to pulverized coal and CCGT technology, 
the two primary baseload alternatives to nuclear, at least over the next 25 years if there is no 
price places on CO2 emissions (AEI AEO 2006). Will potential investors view nuclear 
investments as being the lowest cost or the most profitable base load generation alternative?  
Here I draw primarily on work done in connection with the MIT Future of Nuclear Power Study 
(2003) and more recent work published by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2006, Chapter 
13) in 2006. 
  There are several primary variables that determine the expected life-cycle costs of 
alternative generating technologies with a given generating capacity.  These are (a) the 
“overnight” construction cost, (b) the construction period and associated cash flows, (c) 
financing costs and any associated cash flow constraints, (d) corporate income tax rules, (e) fuel 
costs and their assumed real rate of escalation over time, (f) non-fuel operation and maintenance 
expenses, (g) replacement capital expenditures during the life of the plant, (g) the life-cycle 
capacity factor of the plant, and (h) the economic life of the plant.  The future values of all of 
these variables that will be realized in practice are necessarily uncertain at the time development 
of a project begins.  Let me say a few things about several of these cost drivers. 
  The overnight construction cost of a generating plant is a value that is often 
misunderstood.  It is the hypothetical cost of a generating plant if it could be built instantly 
("overnight").  The number does not reflect inflation, the costs of construction financing, or the 
length of time that it takes to build the plant and associated cash flows. Accordingly, the 
overnight cost value must be combined with assumptions about the construction period, the 
profile of cash flows during construction, real input price escalation during construction, 
financing costs, taxes, insurance and other variables to arrive at the total costs of building the 
plant up to the point when it enters commercial operation.  Once the plant is completed, 
financing costs, cash flow constraints associated with debt repayment schedules, taxes, 
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equipment replacement costs, fuel, operation and maintenance costs, insurance, and the assumed 
capacity factor (production of electricity per unit of capacity), are then combined to yield a 
pattern of expected post-construction “break-even” cash flows. The pre-construction and post-
construction cash flows are combined and then discounted back to the present (or the time the 
project under consideration would proceed with the licensing and developing process) using the 
assumed post-tax weighted average cost of capital relevant to the project.  This present value of 
future cash flows is then “levelized” over the life-cycle output of the plant in constant dollars to 
yield a levelized real life-cycle cost of producing a kWh of electricity for each technology.  One 
can think of this as an annualized real life-cycle cost per kWh for each technology or, in a market 
context, as the real life-cycle price per kWh that the plant would have to realize in a competitive 
market to make it a break-even investment (just profitable enough to cover its total costs, 
including the opportunity cost of equity invested in the plants). Different assumptions about the 
overnight construction cost, financing costs, income tax rates and associated accounting 
procedures, capacity factors, fuel price escalation and a few other variables can have very 
significant effect on the results. 
  There has been substantial controversy over the appropriate assumptions for the 
overnight construction costs for nuclear plants.  Unlike, pulverized coal and CCGT plants, there 
is no recent construction cost experience for nuclear plants in the U.S. or Europe.  The nuclear 
plant vendors have advertised very low overnight construction cost numbers based on their own 
non-transparent engineering cost calculations.  These projections should be viewed with some 
skepticism both because they are not backed up with firm financial commitments and because 
the nuclear industry has a poor record of forecasting construction costs (IEA 2006, page 372).  
Moreover, these cost estimates appear to exclude certain “owner’s costs” such as engineering 
costs, site acquisition costs, insurance costs, spare parts inventory costs, training costs, licensing 
and other regulatory costs.  I consider most of the recent vendor cost estimates to be implausibly 
low. 
  The MIT study made use of actual construction cost experience for recent nuclear plants 
completed in Japan and South Korea (MIT 2003, Appendix to Chapter 5).  I have supplemented 
that analysis with more recent information on the reported contractual cost of the nuclear plant 
being built by AREVA-Siemens for TVO in Finland (which appears to exclude owner’s costs 
and some have argued does not cover the total costs that AEVA-Siemens will actually incur), the 
   10 
reported cost quoted for the plant being built for Electricté de France (EDF),
6 also supplied by 
AREVA, to confirm what is a good base case overnight cost estimate for a new nuclear plant.  
The number used as the base case overnight cost estimate in the MIT study was $2,000/kW in 
constant $2002 or about $2,300/kW in constant $2006.  I believe that this is still good base case 
overnight construction cost estimate, recognizing that there is considerable uncertainty about 
what actual construction costs will turn out to be.  This base case overnight cost number is much 
lower than the construction costs experience for nuclear plants completed in the U.S. during the 
1980s and early 1990s but much higher than vendor cost forecasts.   
  The MIT study also made the base case assumption that new nuclear plants could be 
completed in five years, as does the more recent IEA study (IEA 2006, p. 365).  This is below 
the construction periods experienced by every major nuclear power country except Japan (IEA 
2006, page 373) and, I consider it to be reasonable, though perhaps on the optimistic side.  The 
base case in the MIT study also assumed an 85% life-cycle capacity factor, though alternative 
cases were considered as well.  The 2006 IEA study makes similar assumptions about life-cycle 
nuclear capacity factors.  This value is lower than that assumed in most vendor presentations 
(e.g. 90+%), but is significantly higher than the global life-cycle capacity factors realized 
historically by the world's nuclear power plants.
7  In this regard, it should be noted that low 
capacity factors that may be associated with the “break-in” of new plants right after they are 
completed yield larger economic penalties in a present-value calculation than do low capacity 
factors late in the life of a plant.  Other assumptions used in the MIT study can be found in the 
Appendix to Chapter 5 of the MIT study (MIT 2003) and for the IEA study in Chapter 13 (IEA 
2006, p. 365).   
  Table 1 reports estimates of the real levelized costs of nuclear plants, pulverized coal 
plants, and CCGT plants under a variety of different assumptions.
8  The first column reflects the 
assumption that the plant will be built as a stand-alone merchant project with a 40-year life.  The 
                                            
6 An EDF Press release issued May 4, 2006 quotes a construction cost number of 3.3 billion euros for a 1600 MWe 
plant or over $2,500/kW at current exchange rates.  AREVA-Siemens committed to build the equivalent plant in 
Finland for 3 billion euros, but construction delays have likely increased the actual costs of building it.  AREVA has 
been criticized for not recovering the engineering and development costs it incurred to develop the 1600 Mw EPR in 
the revenues it expects to earn from these first two projects, but I think that these criticisms are unfair. 
7 A few countries, including Finland, have life-cycle capacity factors that are slightly higher than 90%, but this has 
not been the norm. 
8 Note that only about 3% of the electricity supplied in the U.S. relies on oil-fired generating plants.  They are used 
primarily for peaking (low load facto) purposes. 
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competitive market environment in which merchant plants would be built is reflected in 
assumptions about the cost of equity and debt capital, the debt-equity ratio, debt repayment 
constraints, taxes, etc.  The second column performs similar calculations for a regulated plant 
financed by a utility on its balance sheet using a lower cost of capital than the merchant plant and 
a longer amortization period.  Implicit in this case is the assumption that consumers bear most of 
the construction cost and operating performance risks associated with the project.  In both cases, 
we initially assume that the cost of capital for nuclear plants is higher than those for coal and gas 
CCGT plants due to cost, regulatory and other uncertainties. 
  It is evident in Table 1 that with the base case assumption about the overnight 
construction cost of a nuclear plant, the nuclear plant is not competitive with pulverized coal and 
is only competitive with CCGT generating capacity when expected real life-cycle natural gas 
prices are high (about $7.60/Mcf expressed in $2006 general price levels).  For nuclear to be 
competitive with coal, overnight construction costs must fall by about 25% from the base case 
assumptions and financing costs must be equivalent to those for coal and CCGT plants.  Thus, if 
nuclear is to be competitive with fossil-fuel alternatives, especially coal, construction costs must 
fall significantly from our base case assumptions and there must be no cost of capital premium 
required to finance nuclear plants.  Even here, the cost saving from building a nuclear plant 
rather than a coal plant is quite small. 
  Table 2 reports the same results for the merchant case but includes prices for carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions.  The CO2 prices vary from about $13/ton to about $55/ton.
9  These 
prices could result from the imposition of a mandatory cap and trade program as in the EU or 
from a tax on CO2 emissions. Obviously, CO2 prices burden fossil-fueled plants and make 
nuclear plants relatively more attractive economically.  At somewhere between $25/ton and 
$50/ton CO2, nuclear becomes economical in almost all cases unless gas prices return to low 
levels and even if significant reductions from the base case overnight construction cost numbers 
cannot be realized.  It is interesting to note that it is likely that CO2 prices within this range over 
the next 50 years would be necessary to stabilize CO2 emissions by 2050 and to make carbon 
capture and sequestration an economical option for using coal to generate electricity (MIT Future 
of Coal Study, in process). 
                                            
9 Note that the carbon (C) prices utilized in the MIT study have been expressed in terms of equivalent CO2 prices 
here using an adjustment factor of 3.67 to reflect the differences in atomic weights of C and CO2. 
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  The IEA released its World Energy Outlook 2006 in November 2006 (IEA 2006).  It 
includes a detailed analysis of the future of nuclear power globally in Chapter 13.  The focus on 
nuclear power in this study was stimulated by concerns about CO2 emissions and the fact that 
nuclear power is an electricity supply option that generates electricity without producing 
significant quantities of CO2.  The results of the IEA study of the expected costs of nuclear 
power and associated uncertainties are reasonably similar to those in the MIT study.  The 
expected cost per kWh from new nuclear plants varies from about 5.0 cents/kWh to about 8.0 
cents/kWh in $2005, depending on assumptions about discount rates (cost of financing) and 
overnight construction costs (IEA, 2006, p. 368).  The range of real levelized costs from reported 
in Table 1 above, after adjusting the numbers to bring them to $2005 price levels for 
comparability with the IEA study, are about 4.0 cents/kWh to about 7.5 cents/kWh.  The IEA 
numbers do not include the very low construction cost case ($1500/kW) in the MIT study, so 
they are otherwise quite comparable.  For nuclear to be competitive with coal both a low 
discount rate and low construction costs must be realized if there is no price place on CO2 
emissions.  I do not believe that the low discount rate assumption that the IEA seems to focus on 
subsequently and in the summary of the chapter on nuclear power is consistent with investment 
by private firms that do not receive subsidies and pay income and property taxes in either a 
competitive environment or in a regulatory environment with significant construction cost and 
operating performance sharing incentive arrangements. 
  The IEA study also examines the impact of CO2 prices on the relative economics of 
nuclear vs. fossil fuel alternative generating technologies.  From the figures in the IEA report it 
looks like the impacts of CO2 prices are qualitatively similar to those in the MIT study.  With a 
price between $30 and $50/ton of CO2, nuclear would be competitive with coal even with 
relatively high overnight construction costs and high financing costs (discount rates).  
  The figures in Table 1 and Table 2 and those in the IEA study, combined with uncertainty 
about licensing and permit approval costs and success rates, are consistent with the lack of much 
commercial interest by investors in new nuclear power plants in the U.S. until relatively 
recently.
10  In my view, the primary case for investment in new nuclear plants is that they will 
displace CO2 producing generating technologies, especially coal.  The combination of efforts to 
                                            
10 Unlike several countries in Europe there has never been a formal ban on building new nuclear power plants in the 
U.S, 
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streamline the licensing process without sacrificing safety, financial incentives included in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, and a growing awareness of the implications of possible future U.S. 
policies to place a price on CO2 emissions (e.g. passage of some variant of the McCain-
Leiberman Act and continuing diffusion of individual state CO2 mitigation policies), have been 
the primary contributors to a renewal of interest in investments in new nuclear plants in the U.S.  
However, absent significant CO2 mitigation benefits, the economic advantages of nuclear power 
over coal (either PC or IGCC meeting EPA air quality standards for criteria pollutants) in the 
U.S. are, at best, too small to justify other baggage that comes with nuclear power: safety risks, 
proliferation risks, and waste disposal problems.  I turn to the recent efforts to stimulate 
investment in new nuclear plants in the U.S. in the next section. 
 
4. Institutional Changes and Financial Incentives 
Streamlined NRC licensing process 
  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has adopted new regulatory procedures to 
reduce the costs and delays associated with licensing new commercial nuclear plants.  First, the 
NRC now has a process in place to certify the safety of Standard Plant Design Specifications 
before the associated plants are included in a specific construction and operating license 
application for a new plant.  Once a Standard Plant Design has received safety certification from 
the NRC, plant developers who choose to adopt the certified plant design as approved do not (in 
theory) have to go through a new plant design safety review for each specific plant seeking a 
construction and operating license.
11  As of November 2006, three plant designs have been 
certified through this process, one plant design is near the completion of the certification process, 
and five plant designs are in a pre-application review process at the NRC (including AREVA's 
EPR, the first model of which is under construction in Finland).
12
  Second, the NRC has created a new early site permitting process that permits companies 
to pre-license sites where they may ultimately choose to build a new nuclear  plant, but can do so 
before the decision is made to go forward with a plant.  Thus site certification can proceed and 
be separated from the construction and operating license process.  As of November 2006 four 
                                            
11 This means that as a practical matter the U.S. will abandon the historical approach which did not rely on 
standardized plant designs.  The U.S. has learned at least something from the French. 
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applications have been made under this early site permitting process.
13  However, it is not 
necessary for a developer to go through this process.  A developer can choose instead to go 
directly to the Combined Construction Permit and Operating License (COL) process which will 
include site certification. 
  The new COL process is the third innovation that the NRC has introduced.   Under the 
regulatory process in place when the existing fleet of plants was built, each plant had to first go 
through a construction license process that involved a safety review of both the plant and the site.  
Once a construction permit was issued the developer could then proceed to build the plant.   
When the plant was completed the owner/operator then had to apply for a separate operating 
license.  There were significant delays at each stage of this process, including delays resulting 
from appeals to the federal courts and resulting extensions of the evidentiary regulatory hearing 
process.  The NRC has now created a streamlined licensing approach in which a certified plant 
design (and an early site permit if one has been obtained) can go directly into a Combined 
Construction and Operating License (COL) process.  Once the COL is granted the developer can 
proceed to build the plant.  When it is completed the NRC then would perform a series of 
inspections, verifications, tests and analysis to confirm that the plant was built in accordance 
with all COL license criteria.  A second regulatory proceeding to review a separate application 
for an operating license would not be required. 
  In theory, this new regulatory process should reduce licensing costs and delays.   
However, the COL process has not been tested as no proposed plants have yet gone through it 
from beginning to end.  Accordingly, how well it will work in practice, and how it will be 
affected by hostile intervenors in the licensing process and appeals to the federal courts is very 
uncertain.  The first few proposed plants that actually go through the COL process with a plant 
that meets the pre-approved Standard Design Specifications will teach us a lot about the duration 
and costs of this new licensing process.  Indeed, the first plants through this process will provide 
valuable information to all potential investors in nuclear plants, but there is no obvious way for 
them to appropriate the value of this information to help them to cover any "first of a kind" 
regulatory costs they incur by being the first projects that go through the new regulatory process. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
12 Nuclear Energy Institute, www.nei.org accessed November 27, 2006. 
13 Ibid.
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Financial incentives in the energy policy act of 2005 
  I think that it is fair to say that prior to the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("the 
Act"), investors were not exactly beating down the door of the NRC to file applications of Early 
Site Permits or COLs.  However, the Act provides a number of significant financial incentives to 
the first few plants that enter the COL process, are built and ultimately begin to operate.  These 
incentives, combined with rising fossil fuel costs, rising wholesale market prices, and growing 
recognition that CO2 prices may be imposed at some point within the life of a new plant that 
enters construction today, have stimulated much more serious interest among investors in 
building new nuclear plants. 
  The Act provides for a 1.8 cent/kWh investment tax credit for new nuclear capacity 
during its first 8 years of operation.  This subsidy is limited to no more than $125 million per 
year per 1,000 Mw of capacity and no more that 6,000 Mw of new capacity can receive this 
subsidy.  In addition, new nuclear plants are eligible to apply for loan guarantees for up to 80% 
of a plant's construction cost.  These loan guarantees will reduce the cost of debt financing for 
projects that receive them and allow the financing of the projects to be more highly leveraged.  
These subsidies reduce the life-cycle costs of a new nuclear plant by on the order of $20/Mwh, 
assuming that they operate with 85% capacity factors (IEA, p. 376).
14  The Act also provides 
"insurance" against regulatory delays for the first 6,000 Mw of new capacity that applies for a 
COL.  The first two plants are eligible for up to $500 million of payments for the costs of 
regulatory delay and the next four plants for up to $250 million each.  The details of how much 
in loan guarantees will actually be made available by the federal government (all generating 
plants that do not produce greenhouse gases are eligible), how investment tax credits will be 
allocated if more than 6,000 Mw of new capacity enters service during the eligibility window 
specified in the Act, and how the costs of regulatory delay will be determined are yet to be 
specified by the federal government.   
  The rationale for these financial incentives is that there are "first mover costs," including 
potential costs of regulatory delays, that are acting as barriers to restarting construction of new 
nuclear plants and allowing the development of new nuclear designs to move down a learning 
curve to realize cost savings.  According to this theory, by subsidizing the first 6,000 Mw of new 
capacity, the direct costs of construction and uncertainty about the speed and costs of the 
                                            
14 My colleagues at MIT have derived estimates of the aggregate value of the subsidy that are only slightly smaller. 
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regulatory process will fall and nuclear investment will then be economic without further special 
subsidies.  It is a "learning by doing" type of justification. 
  Since the passage of the Act, intentions to pursue roughly two-dozen new nuclear plants 
have been "announced" by individual generating companies or consortia of generating 
companies.
15 Many of these companies have substantial nuclear operating experience.  However, 
announcing the intention to pursue a project and actually making a significant financial 
commitment to proceed with a COL and construction once it is granted are not the same thing.  
No applications for COLs have yet been made and as far as I know there have been no firm 
contracts consummated to purchase equipment and construction services from nuclear equipment 
suppliers and construction companies.  The first COL applications are forecast for late in 2007 
and this suggests that it is unlikely that any new nuclear capacity will enter service much before 
2015. 
  Clearly, a subsidy of about $20/Mwh plus insurance against the costs of regulatory delay 
is a significant incentive for nuclear plant investments that are eligible to receive the subsidy. It 
is equivalent to placing a price of about $25/ton of CO2 emissions from pulverized coal plants.  
However, since the subsidies are available for only the first 6,000 Mw of new nuclear capacity, 
the long term effects of the program on investment in nuclear capacity will depend on (a) the 
industry being able credibly to reduce construction costs to a level significantly below 
$2,300/kW ($2006), (b) to keep construction time at 5 years or less, or (c) for the federal 
government to introduce a program that places a price on CO2 emissions of at least $25/ton of 
CO2. 
  These conclusions are consistent with the EIA's forecasts of investment in new nuclear 
plants between 2005 and 2030 contained in its 2006 Annual Energy Outlook (IEA AEO 2006, 
pp. 79-80).  The EIA reference case (which does not place a price on CO2 emissions) reflects the 
subsidies included in the Act and projects 6,000 Mw of new nuclear capacity by 2030.  The 
results for the reference case suggest that these nuclear subsidies make the 6,000 Mw they apply 
to economical investments, but that nuclear plant construction costs do not fall fast enough to 
make further post-subsidy nuclear plant investment economical.
16  If this result is realized in 
reality it would suggest that the subsidy program had failed to achieve its primary "learning by 
                                            
15 Nuclear Energy Institute web site http://www.nei.org accessed November 18, 2006. 
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doing" goals.  The EIA's 2006 AEO also presents results for two alternative cases.  The first case 
reduces the construction costs of new nuclear plants by 20% from the reference case values 
(roughly consistent with the low construction cost case in the MIT study).  With a 20% 
construction cost reduction, about 34,000 Mw of new nuclear capacity enters service by 2030 
(IEA AEO 2006, p. 84).  I consider this to be a challenging but possible result to achieve.  
Finally, the EIA 2006 AEO contains a "vendor cost goal" case that requires an average reduction 
in construction costs from the reference case of 35%, falling to a 44% reduction by 2030 (IEA 
AEO 2006, p. 84).  This case yields 77,000 Mw of new nuclear capacity by 2030.  I consider the 
cost reduction assumptions in this case to be implausible.  However, a cost reduction of 20% plus 
a carbon dioxide emissions price of about $25/ton CO2 could yield a similar result. 
  Before concluding this section, there is one observation that I want to make about 
"national security" rationales for nuclear power that appear frequently in the media and are 
sometimes exploited by nuclear power proponents.  First, almost no oil is used to generate 
electricity in the U.S. and this fact is not likely to change in the future.  Second, in the EIA AEO 
2006 scenarios discussed above, new nuclear plants primarily are substitutes for new coal plants.  
As a result, the investment in nuclear capacity does not have a significant impact on imports of 
oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is forecast to grow rapidly over this period.   
Accordingly, there does not appear to be an "energy security" case for investment in new nuclear 
plants.  As I have already indicated, I believe that the primary policy rationale for providing 
special subsidies to "first mover" nuclear power plants is to maintain nuclear power as an option 
for generating electricity that would support a U.S. policy to reduce CO2 emissions that would 
otherwise be produced from coal burning power plants. 
 
5. Other Potential Institutional Barriers 
 
  There are other potential institutional barriers to a significant growth in new nuclear 
capacity that need to be taken into account.  First, the unsettled state of electricity sector 
restructuring and deregulation (Joskow 2006a) suggests to me that it is unlikely that we will see 
much if any investment in new nuclear capacity in states that have adopted competitive market 
models, at least until wholesale and retail market designs deal with design flaws that create 
general disincentives for investment in new generating capacity (Joskow 2006b).  Moreover, 
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stabilizing wholesale and retail market designs so that investors can count on a clear, stable, and 
fair market environment will need to occur to support this type of investment.  Second, potential 
investors in new nuclear plants will still have to deal with state and local regulatory authorities 
and potential resistance from anti-nuclear groups that have been quiet during the long hiatus in 
new nuclear plant construction.  Historically, the greatest opposition to nuclear plants has been in 
the Northeast and the West Coast, especially California.
17  Many of the states that have adopted 
competitive market models also happen to be located in these regions of the country.   
  The current state of competitive electricity markets in the U.S. combined with local 
opposition to new nuclear plants is not an attractive combination for potential investors.   
(Ironically, the economics of nuclear investment are quite promising in New England, New 
York, New Jersey, California and Texas because existing natural gas fueled generation is on the 
margin in many hours of the year and, as a result, wholesale prices are quite high there.)  On the 
other hand, there are many existing nuclear plant sites, including in states which have not 
adopted competitive electricity market models, that were designed to accommodate more nuclear 
plants than were actually built on these sites. There is room to build additional nuclear capacity 
on several of these sites. In most cases, the residents in the areas near these sites have come to 
accept nuclear power plants and, indeed, to enjoy the property tax revenue that they produce.  
They are likely to be favorably disposed to investments to expand capacity on at least some of 
these existing sites. 
  The final potential institutional barrier to significant investment in new nuclear capacity 
in the U.S. is the continued inability of the federal government to fulfill its commitment to take 
back spent nuclear fuel and to provide for its safe long-term storage and disposal.  The progress 
on getting the Yucca Mountain site licensed to receive spent fuel continues to be subject to 
delays and it is opposed by powerful politicians in Nevada.  While investment in new nuclear 
plants might proceed without a complete resolution of waste disposal issues, unless credible 
interim and final waste disposal institutions are placed into operation, it may create significant 
investor disincentives and public opposition to a major program of nuclear expansion.  
 
                                            
17 Of course it is possible that the current concerns about CO2 emissions will make groups that historically opposed 
nuclear power more favorably disposed towards it now, and there is some evidence that environmental groups have 
moved in this direction. 
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6. Conclusions 
  The future for investment in new nuclear plants in the U.S. is brighter than it has been for 
many years.  The support and subsidies from the federal government contained in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 and the earlier reforms in the federal licensing process have given the nuclear 
industry what it says it needs to "get over the hump" and stimulate a significant program of 
investment in new nuclear power plants.  It's now up to the industry to deliver on its claims about 
construction costs, operating performance, and financing costs. 
  All things considered, I believe that investment in new nuclear plants is likely to proceed 
more slowly than may be implied by the recent euphoria in the industry.  I believe that projects 
are most likely to proceed (a) on existing sites, (b) in states that have not adopted competitive 
market models, and (c) where there is support from local authorities.  Among the competitive 
states, Texas is the most likely candidate for investment in new nuclear plants for both economic 
and political reasons.  A nuclear investment program will be larger and proceed more quickly if 
the nuclear equipment vendors and the construction firms are willing to take on more of the 
construction cost and operating performance risk than they did during the 1980s, at least until the 
first dozen of so plants are completed and credible information about construction costs, 
construction time, and regulatory costs and delays have been confirmed by actual experience 
rather than hypothetical spreadsheet calculations.  Finally, if the U.S. adopts a cap and trade 
program for CO2 emissions that yield prices in the range of $25 to $50/ton of CO2, it will make 
investment in new nuclear power plants much more attractive financially than it is today, 
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     Merchant   Traditional  Regulatory 






Base  Case  ($2000/kW)    6.7   5.2 
 
25% Lower Construction 
Costs  ($1500/kW)     5.5   4.4 
 
Reduce Construction time 
By 12 months (4 years)      5.3    3.6 
 
Reduce financing costs to       
Equivalent coal and CCGT      4.2    3.6 
 
 
Pulverized Coal     4.2   3.5 
 
 
Gas CCGT Cases 
 
Low gas prices ($3.77/Mcf)      3.8    3.6 
 
Moderate gas prices ($4.42/Mcf)    4.1    4.0 
 
High gas prices ($6.72/Mcf)      5.6    5.7 
  
                                            
18 MIT (2003), p. 42 and Appendix to Chapter 5.  In the merchant case the plant owner bears all construction cost, 
operating performance and market risk. 
19 Author’s calculations.  In the traditional regulated case consumers bear the costs or benefits of all “prudent” 
construction cost overruns, operating performance variations, and changes in market values. 
   TABLE 2 
 
Effects of CO2 Prices on Real Levelized Cost of Electricity 





   $0/ton CO2  $13.50/ton CO2       $27/ton CO2  $54/ton CO2
 
 
Pulverized Coal        4.2     5.4      6.6      9.0 
 
 





Base Case          6.7     6.7      6.7      6.7 
 
-25%  Construction 
Cost Case          5.5     5.5      5.5      5.5 
 
Lowest cost Case        4.2     4.2      4.2      4.2     
                                            
20 See Table 1 for the $0/ton CO2 case.  For the other cases see MIT (2003), page 42 and appendix to Chapter 5.  
Note that carbon prices expressed in $US(2002) per metric ton of carbon in the MIT Report have been express in 
$US(2002) per metric ton of CO2 here by dividing by 3.67 for easier comparisons with other studies. 
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